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INTRODUCTION

“We’re running out of time. I don’t have time to play nice.”1
Actress Rose McGowan knew it was time to take a stand, and so did
thousands of others.2 In 2017, victims of sex discrimination and
harassment in the workplace exorcised their feelings of helplessness
by speaking out against the power of patriarchy.3 The Silence
Breakers, as they came to be known, started a global movement and
were collectively selected as the TIME Person of the Year.4
From pop artist Taylor Swift to journalist Megyn Kelly to
university professor Celeste Kidd, numerous victims broke the
silence by telling their own stories of sexual harassment and
discrimination, simultaneously validating the stories of women
internationally.5 Their stories sparked a revolution that empowered
the victims and shamed the perpetrators.6 The 2017 Golden Globe
Awards saw the culmination of this international movement where
the accessory of the evening was a black Time’s Up pin that
represented an initiative to fight sexual misconduct across the
country.7
Far from the swanky Beverly Hills hotel where the award
ceremony was held, Alisha Coleman, a middle-aged woman from
Columbus, Georgia, decided to speak up about her own story of sex
discrimination by confronting Congress’s approach to providing
victims relief.8 Coleman’s complaint, filed in the Middle District of
Georgia, ignited a firestorm of controversy regarding the statutory
1 Eliana Dockterman, Haley Edwards, & Stephanie Zacharek, TIME Person of the Year
2017: The Silence Breakers, TIME (Dec. 18 2017), http://time.com/time-person-of-the-year2017-silence-breakers/.
2 See id. (discussing the stories of women who decided to speak out against sexual
discrimination and harassment).
3 See id. (describing a “revolution of refusal”).
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 See Eliana Dockterman, Survivors Used #MeToo to Speak Up. A Year Later, They’re
Still Fighting for Meaningful Change, TIME (Sept. 20 2018), http://time.com/5401638/silencebreakers-one-year-later-2 (describing the development of a “sustaining movement” after
2017).
7 See Valeriya Safronova, Time’s Up Pins Are the Political Accessory at the Golden Globes,
NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 7 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/07/fashion/times-up-pinsgolden-globes-2018.html (detailing the mission behind the Time’s Up initiative).
8 See Complaint, Coleman v. Bobby Dodd Institute, Inc., No. 4:17-CV-00029, 2017 WL
2486080 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 31, 2017) (arguing that discrimination based on pre-menopausal
conditions should entitle plaintiff to relief under the PDA).
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interpretations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),
as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA).9
Coleman asserted the rights she thought Title VII afforded her and
zealously advocated for its protection.10 Although the parties settled
in lieu of receiving an answer from the Eleventh Circuit, the
unusual case raises an unprecedented sex-discrimination issue and
presents a timely platform to reevaluate the PDA.11
II. COLEMAN V. BOBBY DODD INSTITUTE, INC.
On April 26, 2016, Alisha Coleman was fired from her job as an
E-911 Call Taker by Bobby Dodd Institute Inc. (BDI), a job training
and employment agency located at Fort Benning, Georgia, that
serves people with disabilities.12 Coleman was experiencing
irregular and unpredictable menstrual periods because she was premenopausal.13
Two main incidents led to BDI firing Coleman. In August 2015,
Coleman unexpectedly experienced her menstrual period which
leaked fluid onto her office chair.14 Following the incident, Coleman
received a disciplinary write-up from the Site Manager and Human
Resources Director who warned her “that she would be fired if she
ever soiled another chair from sudden onset menstrual flow.”15
Almost a year later, on April 22, 2016, Coleman was walking to the
bathroom at the workplace and “menstrual fluid unexpectedly
9 See, e.g., Jay-Anne B. Casuga, Firing Over A Sex-Linked Condition: Is It
Discrimination?,
BLOOMBERG
DAILY
LABOR
REPORT
(Nov.
20,
2017),
https://www.bna.com/firing-sexlinked-condition-n73014472272/ (“[C]ourts still grapple with
what the federal protection against sex discrimination encompasses.”); Areva Martin, This
Woman Was Fired for a Heavy Period Leak, TIME (Oct. 26 2017), http://time.com/4999185/
woman-fired-for-period-leak/ (proclaiming that the reasoning used by courts to discriminate
against pregnant women in the last century resembles the pattern that inspired Congress to
enact the PDA in the first place).
10 Complaint, supra note 8, at 1.
11 See Katheryn Tucker, Woman Allegedly Fired Over Having a Period at Work Settles,
DAILY REPORT ONLINE (Nov. 13 2017), https://www.law.com/dailyreportonline/
sites/dailyreportonline/2017/11/10/woman-allegedly-fired-over-having-a-period-at-worksettles (discussing plaintiff’s choice to settle).
12 See Initial Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 3–4, Coleman v. Bobby Dodd Institute, Inc.,
No. 4:17-CV-00029, 2017 WL 6762403 (11th Cir. Aug. 14, 2017) (describing Coleman’s
employment and firing).
13 Id. at 3.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 4.
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leaked onto the carpet.”16 Four days later, BDI fired her for failure
to “practice high standards of personal hygiene and maintain a
clean, neat appearance while on duty.”17
On January 31, 2017, Coleman filed suit in the Middle District
of Georgia, Columbus Division, alleging violations of Title VII, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e.18 The District Court ultimately granted BDI’s
motion to dismiss on June 8, 2017, holding that terminating a
female employee for soiling company property on two occasions due
to menopause, a uniquely feminine condition, does not constitute
sex discrimination under the PDA.19
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to
hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, privileges of employment, because of such individual’s .
. . sex.”20 Title VII protects all discrimination “because of sex,” which
the PDA defines as follows: “[t]he terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the
basis of sex’ include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis
of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions . . . .”21 Title
VII is silent as to whether other uniquely female conditions are
included under the phrase “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex.”
A sex-discrimination claim under Title VII can be supported by
direct or circumstantial evidence. The court characterized
Coleman’s complaint as alleging a claim based upon direct evidence
of sex discrimination.22 Her employer terminated her because of a
uniquely female condition. To allege a claim based on direct
evidence, a plaintiff must present “evidence which reflects a
discriminatory or retaliatory attitude correlating to the
discrimination or retaliation complained of by the employee and
that, if believed, proves the existence of a fact without inference or

16
17
18

Id.
Id.
See Complaint, supra note 8, at 1 (seeking both legal and equitable remedies under Title

VII).
19 Coleman v. Bobby Dodd Inst., Inc., No. 4:17-CV-29, 2017 WL 2486080, at *2 (M.D. Ga.
July 8, 2017) (“Nothing in the text of Title VII, the PDA, or case law interpreting these Acts
supports such a broad interpretation of the law.”).
20 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
21 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).
22 Coleman, 2017 WL 2486080, at *1.
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presumption.”23 Coleman alleged that firing her because of a
uniquely female condition amounted to firing her “because of” or “on
the basis of” sex; she further argued that menopause fell within the
“related medical conditions” protected by the PDA.24
The court held that the PDA does not cover uniquely female
conditions unrelated to pregnancy, and to prevail the plaintiff must
allege and prove that her condition was treated less favorably than
a comparable male related medical condition.25 Following this
rationale, the court reasoned that Coleman’s excessive
menstruation was related to menopause, not pregnancy or
childbirth, and therefore, was not protected under the Act.26
The court also observed that Coleman did not attempt to proceed
under the traditional McDonnell Douglas analytical framework,
which is typically reserved for claims based on circumstantial
evidence.27 Under this framework, Coleman might have created a
prima facie case of discrimination by alleging that (1) she is in a
protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) she
suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) her employer
treated similarly situated employees who are not members of the
protected class more favorably (the “comparator” requirement).28
Her employer would then have the right to establish a nondiscriminatory reason for its action, and Coleman would have to
show its reason is pretextual to maintain her claim.29
However, Coleman would have only satisfied the first three
prongs of McDonnell Douglas. Coleman, a female, was a member of
a protected class; she suffered from the adverse employment event
of discharge; and she was qualified for and was capable of service in
23 Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1320 (11th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1086 (11th Cir. 2004) (alterations and
quotation marks omitted)).
24 Initial Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 12, at 22–23.
25 Coleman, 2017 WL 2486080, at *2.
26 Id.
27 Id. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (establishing the
prima facie four-pronged test for discrimination claims).
28 See Slater v. Energy Services Group, 441 F. App’x 637, 640 (11th Cir. 2011) (utilizing
the McDonnell Douglas framework for discrimination claims under the PDA). But see
Hamilton v. Southland Christian School, Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1320 (11 th Cir. 2012) (holding
that a plaintiff need not show a nonpregnant comparator who was treated differently “if she
can show enough non-comparison circumstantial evidence to raise a reasonable inference of
intentional discrimination”).
29 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
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her job. But Coleman did not attempt to show that her employer
treated similarly situated males more favorably.30 She pointed to no
alleged male comparator.31 To satisfy this fourth prong, the Court
suggested that Coleman, therefore, could have alleged that male
employees who soiled themselves and company property due to a
medical condition such as incontinence would have been treated
more favorably.32 It is likely Coleman did not pursue this traditional
path because no such comparator evidence existed. She instead had
to rely upon the theory that uniquely female medical conditions
should be treated for Title VII purposes the same as pregnancyrelated medical conditions.
In light of the Coleman decision, legal commentators are
questioning the judicial interpretation of the PDA with regard to
the feminine medical conditions it encompasses.33 The Act’s
ambiguous statutory construction combined with the minimal
federal jurisprudence addressing it often leave women on shaky
ground when determining their rights in the work place. For women
to understand and avail themselves of the protections to which they
are entitled, a consensus must be reached as to which sex-linked
conditions are covered under the PDA and Title VII.
By evaluating the legislative intent and the judicial
interpretations of the PDA, this Note analyzes whether sex-linked
conditions, such as menopause, should be protected under the Act
and Title VII. This Note also addresses the elements required for a
plaintiff alleging a prima facie circumstantial case of sex
discrimination based on a sex-linked condition under Title VII and
specifically focuses on inherent difficulties of imposing the
traditional comparator requirement on such claims.
Section III looks at three relevant episodes in the PDA’s history:
(1) sex-discrimination cases prior to the enactment of the PDA; (2)
the enactment of the PDA and its legislative purpose; and (3) the
relevant jurisprudence after the enactment of the PDA. Section IV
examines various circuit court interpretations of the PDA to
determine which rights are protected against discrimination under
Coleman, 2017 WL 2486080, at *2.
Id.
32 Id.
33 See, e.g., Tucker, supra note 11 (discussing the initial dismissal of Coleman’s case, her
appeal, and the case’s eventual settlement).
30
31
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the PDA. In particular, Section IV analyzes how the circuits
interpret the PDA to protect—or not protect—sex-linked conditions,
including menopause. Section IV also discusses the malecomparator requirement under the prima facie test for a
circumstantial sex-discrimination claim. The focus here is on sexdiscrimination claims where proving a male comparator is
impossible and alternatives to the male-comparator approach.
Section V of this Note concludes by suggesting that Congress
should rewrite the PDA to clearly protect against discrimination of
all sex-linked conditions relating to a woman’s reproductive
capacity and that the judiciary should reevaluate the malecomparator requirement in these situations.
III. BACKGROUND
While the PDA expanded the definition of sex discrimination
under Title VII, some commentators suggest that courts have not
gone far enough in protecting the rights that the PDA was designed
to establish.34 An analysis of the pre-PDA case law, the legislative
history of the PDA, and the post-PDA case law helps illuminate
issues regarding the breadth of the PDA. First, Title VII case
doctrine developed prior to the PDA shows why Congress thought
its enactment necessary.35 Second, the congressional process of
drafting the PDA highlights the Act’s statutory meaning. Finally,
judicial interpretation of the PDA demonstrates how the Act is
currently understood and applied.
A. TITLE VII SEX DISCRIMINATION PRIOR TO THE PDA

Title VII prohibits discrimination that is “because of . . . sex.”36
Absent the PDA’s definition of “because of sex” to include
discrimination “on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or related
medical conditions,”37 Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination

34 See Saru M. Matambanadzo, Reconstructing Pregnancy, 69 SMU L. REV 187, 187 (2016)
(arguing that since the passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in 1978 courts have
failed to fulfill the act’s promise by reducing pregnancy “with all of its social and cultural
meaning, to its ‘purely’ biological elements”).
35 See id. at 201 (outlining the cases that led to the PDA’s enactment).
36 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
37 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).
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has scant legislative history.38 The purpose of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, proposed to Congress by President Kennedy, was
to achieve equal employment opportunities for historically
disadvantaged people by securing legal protections against race
discrimination in the wake of the Birmingham riots.39
The legislative debate over the bill was almost complete when
Virginia Representative Howard W. Smith offered an amendment
proposing to add “sex” to Title VII.40 Many legal commentators
dismiss the legislative history of the “sex” provision as a last minute
attempt to defeat the civil rights legislation by its conservative
opponents who hoped it would lead to abandoning the entire bill.41
These commentators classify the amendment proposal as “aberrant
congressional behavior,”42 “a little more than a ‘joke’ or a political
ploy.”43 The amendment was passed after only a few hours of
discussion.44
Other legal commentators and authors dispute this
characterization, arguing that “[C]ongress added sex as a result of
subtle political pressure from individuals . . . who were serious
about protecting the rights of women.”45 But characterizing the
38 See Carly Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1317 (2012) (suggesting that the legislative history of Title VII’s sex
provision was overshadowed by President Kennedy’s goal to create civil rights legislation).
39 Id. at 1318; see also Daniela M. de la Piedra, Note, Flirting with the PDA: Congress Must
Give Birth to Accommodation Rights that Protect Pregnant Working Women, 17 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 275, 277–78 (2008) (discussing Title VII’s purpose and a plaintiff’s burden of
proof under the McDonnell Douglas test).
40 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964) (statement of Rep. Smith); see also Franklin, supra note 38,
at 1318 (proposing that Title VII’s sex provision was nothing but mere afterthought and a
“last-ditch” to oppose the legal protection against race discrimination that Title VII would
offer).
41 See, e.g., Deborah Epstein, Can ‘A Dumb Ass Woman’ Achieve Equality in the
Workplace? Running the Gauntlet of Hostile Environment Harassing Speech, 84 GEO L.J. 399,
409 n.62 (1996) (characterizing the amendment to prohibit gender discrimination as an effort
to destroy Title VII).
42 Robert C. Bird, More Than a Congressional Joke: A Fresh Look at the Legislative History
of Sex Discrimination of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 3 WM & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 137, 137
(1997).
43 Id. (quoting Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 428 n.36 (E.D. Mich.
1984) (“This Court—like all Title VII enthusiasts—is well aware that the sex discrimination
prohibition was added to Title VII as a joke by the notorious civil rights opponent Howard W.
Smith. But the joke backfired on Smith when the amendment was adopted on the floor of the
House . . . .”)).
44 Franklin, supra note 38, at 1318.
45 Bird, supra note 42, at 138.
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amendment as a political ploy “is so prevalent that it is almost
uniformly followed at the district, appellate, and supreme court
levels.”46 For those who rely upon legislative history for statutory
interpretation, they have been sorely disappointed when they
search the Congressional Record on Title VII.47
Nine years after Title VII’s enactment, the United States
Supreme Court established the framework for analyzing Title VII
discrimination claims that rely solely upon circumstantial
evidence.48 The McDonnell Douglas test, as it came to be known, is
a three-part burden-shifting analysis with the ultimate burden on
the plaintiff to prove that the employer’s proffered legitimate reason
for adverse action was pretext for discrimination.49 The first part of
the test places the burden on the plaintiff to establish a fourpronged prima facie case of discrimination.50
The four prongs include (1) that he or she belongs to a protected
class; (2) that he or she applied for and was qualified for the
particular position; (3) that he or she suffered an adverse
employment action; and (4) that the employer treated similarly
situated employees who are not members of the protected class more
favorably.51 The burden then shifts to the employer who must
articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action.52 If the employer meets its burden of
production, the plaintiff has the opportunity to rebut the employer’s
articulated reason by showing that the reason is pretext for a
discriminatory motive for the employer’s action.53

Id.
See Franklin, supra note 38, at 1318–19 (discussing how Title VII’s lack of a legislative
process provides little guidance in its statutory interpretation and suggesting that Title VII
should be interpreted by considering not only its text and legislative history, but also what
the statute should mean when considering the needs of today’s society).
48 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (establishing the framework
for Title VII cases where the plaintiff presents only circumstantial evidence of
discrimination); see also de la Piedra, supra note 39, at 278 (explaining the McDonnell
Douglas burden shifting analysis that courts use today in evaluating a variety of
discrimination claims).
49 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–04.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
46
47
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Notably, McDonnell Douglas was an employment discrimination
case based on racial discrimination.54 Despite its origin, courts have
applied the McDonnell Douglas test to sex-discrimination cases
before and after the enactment of the PDA.55 In Title VII cases,
courts have adapted the last prong of the test to create a “malecomparator” requirement in which a female plaintiff must allege
that a similarly situated male was treated more favorably.56
The United States Supreme Court decided two notable cases,
Geduldig v. Aiello57 and General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,58 which
motivated Congress to amend Title VII by enacting the PDA.59 In
1974, the Supreme Court addressed pregnancy discrimination
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
in Geduldig.60 Plaintiff, a pregnant woman, was denied medical
benefits under California’s disability insurance.61 California
justified the exclusion by arguing that the expense of paying
benefits for disability accompanying pregnancy misaligned with the
state’s goal of maintaining a self-supporting benefit system.62 The
Court declined to find the state’s justification pretextual.63 Justice
Stewart stated:
Id. at 799–800.
See Slater v. Energy Servs. Grp., 441 F. App’x 637, 640 (11th Cir. 2011) (applying the
McDonnell Douglas framework for discrimination claims under the PDA).
56 See Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 1999) (evaluating if the female
appellant was treated less favorably than similarly situated male employees by considering
whether employees who demonstrate same or similar conduct are disciplined differently).
57 Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), superseded by statute, Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k), as recognized in Newport News Shipbuilding
and Dry Dock Co. v. E.E.O.C., 462 U.S. 669 (1983) (utilizing the McDonnell Douglas
framework for a §1983 claim brought under the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than a Title
VII claim).
58 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), superseded by statute, Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k), as recognized in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
463 U.S. 85 (1983).
59 See Matambanadzo, supra note 34, at 201–04 (analyzing Supreme Court cases before
the PDA).
60 Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 486–87.
61 See id. at 491 (stating the plaintiff’s claim of disability insurance stemmed solely from
normal pregnancy and childbirth rather than attributing her disability to an abnormal
pregnancy).
62 See id. at 492–93 (describing California’s benefit system as an insurance program
intended to function in accordance with insurance concepts and to be totally self-supporting,
never using general state revenues for financial assistance).
63 See id. at 493 (holding that requiring the state to pay pregnancy benefits would make
it too expensive to maintain a self-supporting benefit system).
54
55
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While it is true that only women can become pregnant,
it does not follow that every legislative classification
concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification . . . .
The program divides potential recipients into two
groups—pregnant women and non-pregnant persons.
While the first group is exclusively female, the second
includes members of both sexes.64
Following Geduldig, the majority of employee health benefit
plans reflected the notion that excluding pregnancy-specific benefits
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, so long as pregnancy
was not used as a pretext to discriminate against women.65 Two
years later, the Supreme Court formally addressed a Title VII sexdiscrimination claim based on pregnancy in General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert.66 Female employees brought the discrimination action
alleging that the employer’s disability plan discriminated on the
basis of sex in denying benefits for disabilities arising from
pregnancy.67
Similar to California’s defense in Geduldig, General Electric
presented evidence to show that pregnancy-related disability
coverage would drastically increase the plan’s cost.68 The Court held
that such exclusions were not discriminatory and explained that
[P]regnancy-related
disabilities
constitute
an
additional risk, unique to women, and the failure to
compensate them for this risk does not destroy the
presumed parity of the benefits, accruing to men and
women alike, which results from the facially
evenhanded inclusion of risks.69

Id. at 496 n.20.
See Thomas H. Barnard & Adrienne L. Rapp, Pregnant Employees, Working Mothers
and the Workplace Legislation, Social Change and Where We are Today, 22 J.L. & HEALTH
197, 207 (2009) (discussing the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision regarding a
pregnancy discrimination claim under the Equal Protection Clause).
66 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 125 (1976).
67 Id. at 127.
68 Id. at 131.
69 Id. at 139.
64
65
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As the Court saw it, the denial of benefits for pregnancy-related
disabilities “did not implicate concerns regarding equal treatment,
but rather raised a question of whether employers should be
required to provide ‘greater economic benefits’ to accommodate the
extra disability unique to women.”70 The Court determined that an
employer could treat pregnant workers differently than nonpregnant workers without running afoul of Title VII’s prohibition
against sex discrimination.71 In reaching the same conclusion as
that in Geduldig, the Court turned to “tradition” for guidance in its
statutory interpretation.72
The Court cited the “long history of judicial construction” of the
term discrimination which traditionally only had applied to
practices that classified individuals on the basis of a protected
trait.73 Thus, an employment practice would not qualify as sex
discrimination unless it divided men and women into two groups.74
Pregnancy discrimination does not simply separate men and women
along the axis of biological sex. Rather, it divides pregnant women
and non-pregnant persons into distinct groups, the latter containing
both men and women.
The Supreme Court’s holding overruled existing precedent in six
circuits, conflicted with decisions by eighteen district courts, and
contradicted the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s
(EEOC’s) legislative guidelines for applying Title VII.75 In dissent,
[Justice] Brennan accused the Court . . . of adopting a
mindlessly formalistic approach to the concept of sex
Barnard & Rapp, 22 J.L. & HEALTH at 209 (internal quotations omitted).
General Elec., 429 U.S. at 134.
72 Id. at 145. See also Franklin, supra note 38, at 1362–63 (arguing that the Gilbert court
interpreted Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination in a narrow, formalistic manner in
order to remain faithful to the American legal tradition).
73 General Elec., 429 U.S. at 145 (“The concept of ‘discrimination,’ of course, was well
known at the time of the enactment of Title VII, having been associated with the Fourteenth
Amendment for nearly a century, and carrying with it a long history of judicial
construction.”).
74 See id. (“When Congress makes it unlawful for an employer to ‘discriminate…because
of . . . sex . . . ,’ without further explanation of its meaning, we should not readily infer that it
meant something different from what the concept of discrimination has traditionally meant.
There is surely no reason for any such inference here.” (alterations in original) (citations
omitted)).
75 See Matambanadzo, supra note 34, at 204 (discussing the effect of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Gilbert).
70
71
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discrimination—one that obscured legally salient
questions about the social meaning and effects of
pregnancy discrimination and the ways in which it
reflected and reinforced traditional conceptions of
women’s sex and family roles.76
Similarly, Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority, finding
that “it is the capacity to become pregnant which primarily
differentiates the female from the male.”77 Shortly thereafter, the
Supreme Court applied the Gilbert framework for the last time in
Nasvhille Gas Co. v. Satty.78 A year later, Congress enacted the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 as an amendment to Title VII
to make it clear that discrimination based upon pregnancy violated
Title VII.79
B. THE ENACTMENT OF THE PDA

Rather than creating a separate cause of action for pregnancy
discrimination, the PDA expressly incorporated pregnancy,
childbirth, and medically related conditions into the prohibition
against sex discrimination under Title VII.80 Specifically, the PDA
amended the definition section of Title VII and defined “[t]he terms
‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ [to] include, but [not be]
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions.”81
The PDA superseded the holding in Gilbert. During the debate
over its enactment, Senator Javits stated that “it seems only
Franklin, supra note 38, at 1365.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 162 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78 434 U.S. 136, 141, 143–44 (1977).
79 See AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701, 719–27 (2009) (Ginsburg J., dissenting)
(discussing Congress’s intent to completely repudiate Gilbert by enacting the PDA and
demolish the justifications for employment practices that relied explicitly on stereotyped
conceptions of gender-based roles).
80 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).
81 Id. The PDA provides protection for pregnant employees in two ways. First, the PDA
assures that discrimination “because of sex” includes “on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions.” Id. Second, the PDA requires an employer to accommodate for
pregnant women by stating that “women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt
of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their
ability or inability to work.” Id.
76
77
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commonsense, that since only women can become pregnant,
discrimination
against
pregnant
people
is
necessarily
discrimination against women.”82 Legislative history indicates that
Congress created the PDA to “eradicate confusion by expressly
broadening the definition of sex discrimination in Title VII to
include pregnancy-based discrimination.”83 Congress intended to
extend the bill’s protection to cover “the whole range of matters
concerning the childbearing process.”84
Congress “recognized that, in order to ensure that pregnant
women were no longer treated as second-class citizens on the job,
employers must treat them as well as they treated other workers
whose ability to do their job was affected by injury, disability, or
disease.”85 Congress intended to provide women with equal
opportunities in employment by eradicating “stereotypical
assumptions about women’s reproductive roles.”86 According to
Senator Williams, the PDA’s Congressional sponsor, “[t]he entire
thrust . . . behind this legislation is to guarantee women the basic
right to participate fully and equally in the work force, without
denying them the fundamental right to full participation in family
life.”87
Although the PDA certainly provided new protections for
pregnant employees, it does not provide any guidance for
determining the scope of pregnancy-related medical conditions that
the Act protects.88 While the Act’s legislative history confirms that
its purpose was to place women on equal footing with men in the
workplace despite pregnancy-linked medical conditions, courts have
struggled with how broadly to apply the Act’s protection to medical

123 CONG. REC. 29387 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1977) (statement of Sen. Javits).
H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 4 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4752. See Molly
D. Edwards, Note, The Conceivable Future of Pregnancy Discrimination Claims: Pregnancy
Not Required, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 743, 746 (2010) (discussing the process of President
Carter correcting the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Title VII in Gilbert by signing the
PDA into law).
84 H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 5.
85 Brief of Members of Congress as Amici Curiae In Support of Petitioner at 4, Young v.
UPS, 135 S.Ct. 1338 (2015) (No. 12-1226).
86 Matambanadzo, supra note 34, at 205.
87 123 CONG. REC. 29658 (1977) (statement of Sen. Williams).
88 See Matambanadzo, supra note 34, at 189 (discussing the major limitations of the PDA
including the unclear scope and meaning of medical conditions related to pregnancy).
82
83
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conditions related to a woman’s reproductive system.89 The
following section examines the current state of the PDA’s
jurisprudence and its alignment with the Act’s legislative purpose.
C. TOYING WITH THE PDA

The United States Supreme Court has had few opportunities to
interpret pregnancy discrimination claims under the PDA. Among
those that have arisen, the majority of the cases involved the
accommodation clause of the PDA, rather than determining what
medical conditions the PDA encompasses.90 Generally, the Supreme
Court has interpreted broadly the protections afforded to women
under the Act.
The Supreme Court first interpreted the PDA in Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC.91 In that case, the Supreme
Court held that an employer insurance plan discriminated against
employees on the basis of pregnancy by providing fewer health
insurance benefits for pregnancy than for other medical conditions
to the wives of male employees when compared to the coverage
given to the husbands of female employees.92 Following Congress’s
intent behind the PDA, the Court stated that
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act has now made clear
that, for all Title VII purposes, discrimination based on
a woman’s pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination
because of her sex. And since the sex of the spouse is
always the opposite of the sex of the employee, it follows
inexorably that discrimination against female spouses
in the provision of fringe benefits is also discrimination
against male employees.93
The Supreme Court followed a similar rationale in International
Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc. where it held that fertility
See id. at 189–91 (discussing possible interpretations of the scope of that Act).
See, e.g., California Federal Sav. and Loan Ass’n. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987)
(holding that employers may treat pregnancy better than other disabling conditions, but they
may not treat it any worse for “Congress intended [the PDA to be] a floor beneath which
pregnancy disability benefits may not drop- not a ceiling above which they may not rise.”).
91 Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 676 (1983).
92 Id.
93 Id. at 684.
89
90
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discrimination falls under the PDA’s protection because
discrimination based on a woman’s pregnancy is, on its face,
discrimination because of her sex.94 Johnson Controls had a “fetal
protection” policy barring “women who are pregnant or who are
capable of bearing children” from all jobs involving lead exposure.95
Rejecting Johnson Controls’s argument that the policy was sex
neutral, the Court found that the policy was facially discriminatory
because it “classifies on the basis of gender and childbearing
capacity, rather than fertility alone.”96 Unless medical conditions
associated with a woman’s reproductive capacity inhibit their job
performance, an employer violates the PDA by discriminating
against women because of their potential to become pregnant.97 The
Court explained that an employer cannot unilaterally decide
“whether a woman’s ability to become pregnant and have a family
is more important than her ability to participate in the labor
market.”98
Most recently, the Supreme Court evaluated a PDA claim in
Young v. UPS and addressed the evidentiary standard required for
bringing a pregnancy-discrimination claim.99 Peggy Young, a
pregnant worker, alleged that UPS refused to accommodate her by
adopting a twenty-pound lifting restriction recommended by her
doctor.100 Young presented evidence that UPS accommodated many
of its other drivers who had suffered on-the-job injuries, who
qualified as disabled under the Americans with Disabilities Act, or
who had lost their Department of Transportation certification.101
The Court held that the proper analysis for proving a pregnancydiscrimination claim based on the denial of an accommodation by
circumstantial evidence evolves from the McDonnell Douglas test, a
framework previously created by the Court in Title VII precedent.102
To make out her prima facie case, Young had to allege that she
Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
Id. at 192.
96 Id. at 198.
97 See de la Piedra, supra note 39, at 284 (referencing the Supreme Court’s decision in
International Union v. Johnson Controls in support of this proposition).
98 Id.
99 Young v. UPS, 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1355 (2015).
100 Id. at 1344.
101 Id.
102 Id.; see also generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)
(establishing the framework for a discrimination claim based on circumstantial evidence).
94
95
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belonged to a protected class; that she sought accommodation; that
the employer did not accommodate her, and that the employer did
accommodate others “similar in their ability or inability to work.”103
The Court held that Young adequately established a prima facie
case and presented sufficient evidence that non-pregnant employees
similarly situated in their inability to work were treated more
favorably.104 The decision shows the Court’s attachment to the
comparator requirement of the McDonnell Douglas test, “thereby
requiring women seeking the protections of the Act for pregnancyrelated absences and illnesses to compare themselves to men or
other employees who are not pregnant.”105
The Supreme Court precedent interpreting the PDA makes it
clear that an employer cannot discriminate against its female
employees based on their capacity to become pregnant and that the
McDonnell Douglas framework can be used for circumstantial
evidence cases under the PDA. Notwithstanding this Supreme
Court precedent, some questions remain. Are women protected from
discrimination against all medical conditions related to a woman’s
reproductive system? And, should their claim fail if a comparator is
impossible to find? Legal commentators agree that “the seemingly
clear prohibition against discrimination for pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions in actuality lacks clarity and
consistency across the federal courts.”106
IV. ANALYSIS
The PDA defines discrimination “'because of sex’ to include, but
[not be] limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions.”107 Yet, Congress provided
no guidance regarding what constitutes a “related medical
condition.”108 The following section examines lower courts’
interpretations of which sex-linked conditions the PDA protects,
with a particular focus on evaluating whether menopause should be
afforded the Act’s protection. Furthermore, the section analyzes the
103
104
105
106
107
108

Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354.
Id. at 1355.
Matambanadzo, supra note 34, at 213.
Id. at 215.
42 U.S.C. §2000e(k) (2012).
Id.
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comparator requirement of the McDonnell Douglas test as applied
to medical conditions related to pregnancy.
A. RIGHTS PROTECTED UNDER THE PDA

The courts continue to grapple with the meaning of pregnancy
“related medical conditions” in the PDA.109 The majority of the
disagreements stemming from the scope and meaning of the PDA
correlate with the “dynamic nature of pregnancy” and the medical
conditions that pregnancy encompasses.110 The slim legislative
history provides little help, and the Supreme Court has not yet had
occasion to interpret “related medical conditions.” Must the
condition relate directly to the condition of being pregnant or are
conditions that are simply related to a woman’s reproductive system
protected?
1. Sex-Linked Conditions
Lower courts differ on which female-specific conditions are
related to pregnancy and, therefore, fall within the coverage of the
PDA. The most critiqued judicial decisions involve sexdiscrimination claims based on medical conditions related to a
woman’s reproductive system occurring before or after pregnancy,
such as breastfeeding and lactation.
A late-twentieth century ruling from Judge Simpson of the
United States District Court of the Western District of Kentucky
reflects the notion that breastfeeding is not a medical condition
related to pregnancy.111 Simpson’s narrow interpretation of the PDA
viewed breastfeeding and weaning as “natural concomitants of
pregnancy and childbirth,” rather than related medical
conditions.112 Contrary to the current legal landscape, Simpson
believed that Congress intended to limit related medical conditions
to “incapacitating conditions for which medical care or treatment is
usual and normal,” unlike breastfeeding.113

109 See Matambanadzo, supra note 34, at 215 (discussing how the statutory language of the
PDA leads to ambiguous interpretations).
110 Id.
111 See Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Ky. 1990).
112 Id. at 869.
113 Id.
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More recently, however, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits held
that lactation and breastfeeding, although occurring postpregnancy, are pregnancy-related medical conditions that fall under
the Act’s protection. In EEOC v. Houston Funding II, Ltd., the Fifth
Circuit addressed a pregnancy-discrimination suit regarding
lactation.114 The employee in question was told that her position had
been filled after she asked her employer if she could use private
office space to express breast milk.115
In its analysis, the Fifth Circuit looked to the plain meaning of
the term “medical condition” and determined that it included any
physiological condition, thus encompassing lactation.116 Since
lactation is a physiological result of bearing a child, the court found
that lactation is a pregnancy related medical condition for purposes
of the PDA.117 Therefore, the court held that discharging a female
employee for lactating constitutes sex discrimination in violation of
Title VII.118
Similarly, in Hicks v. Tuscaloosa, the Eleventh Circuit held that
breastfeeding is protected under the PDA.119 Hicks, a female police
officer, was constructively discharged after asking for a desk job to
avoid wearing a restrictive ballistic vest that could cause breast
infections and lead to problems with breastfeeding.120 To determine
whether the city violated the PDA, the court looked to the plain
meaning of the statute and congressional intent.121
The PDA covers discrimination “because of” or “on the basis of
sex” and includes but is “not limited to [discrimination] because of
or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical
conditions.”122 Referring to the statutory canon ejusdem generis, the
court found that the catchall phrase “not limited to” when added to
a specific list, signifies that “additional inclusions would be
appropriate if they are sufficiently similar.”123 The court then held

114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123

EEOC v. Houston Funding II, Ltd., 717 F.3d 425 (5th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 426.
Id. at 428–29.
Id. at 429–30.
Id. at 430.
Hicks v. City of Tuscaloosa, 870 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1256–57.
Id. at 1259–60.
Id. at 1259 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k)(2012)).
Id. at 1259.
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that breastfeeding is a sufficiently similar gender-specific condition
that “clearly imposes upon women a burden that male employees
need not—indeed, could not—suffer.”124
Additionally, the court referred to the purpose of the PDA,
highlighting its aim to protect the physiological occurrences
peculiar to women.125 Congress intended to prohibit discrimination
based on “the whole range of matters concerning the childbearing
process,”126 and give women “the right . . . to be financially and
legally protected before, during, and after [their] pregnancies.”127
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit found that Congress intended the PDA
to cover these kinds of pregnancy-related physiological conditions
that occur post-pregnancy.128
While a consensus now appears to exist with respect to the
inclusion of breastfeeding and lactation under the PDA, whether the
PDA covers fertility treatments remains unsettled. In Krauel v.
Iowa Methodist Medical Center, the Eighth Circuit upheld a district
court opinion that determined that infertility falls outside of the
PDA since it is gender neutral because, unlike pregnancy or
childbirth, both men and women can be infertile.129 The court found
that infertility occurs prior to conception and pregnancy and that
the language of the PDA does not suggest that related medical
conditions should be this inclusive.130
The Seventh Circuit disagreed. In Hall v. Nalco Co., a female
employee was fired for missing work for health reasons related to
her infertility.131 The court held that terminating the employee for
missing work to receive fertility treatments constituted
discrimination because the termination was tied to her potential to
become pregnant and bear a child, rather than the gender-neutral
condition of infertility.132

124 Id. at 1260 (quoting EEOC v. Houston Funding II, Ltd., 717 F.3d 425, 428 (5th Cir.
2013)).
125 Id.
126 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 5 (1978)).
127 124 CONG. REC. 38574 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978) (statement of Rep. Sarasin).
128 Hicks, 870 F.3d at 1260.
129 Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 679–80 (8th Cir. 1996).
130 Id.
131 Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2008).
132 Id. at 649.
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The meaning of a “related medical condition” under the PDA
remains debatable. A restrictive interpretation would include only
medical conditions occurring while physically pregnant. On the
other hand, a broader interpretation would find that all medical
conditions associated with a woman’s reproductive system, such as
menopause, are covered by the PDA.
2. Menopause: The Final Taboo in the Workplace?
On April 26, 2016, BDI fired Alisha Coleman for soiling company
property due to heavy pre-menopausal menstruation.133 Coleman
sued BDI in the Middle District of Georgia, arguing that menopause
was a medical condition related to pregnancy and childbirth under
the PDA and, therefore, should be afforded the Act’s protection.134
The court held that Coleman’s excessive menstruation was related
to menopause, not pregnancy or childbirth and that menopause was
not a medical condition related to pregnancy or childbirth.135
Therefore, under the plain language of the PDA, menopause was
not covered.136 This plain language interpretation would require
Congress to amend the PDA if it determined that menopause or
other uniquely female medical conditions should be expressly
covered by Title VII.
Title VII protects against all discrimination “because of sex,”
which the PDA defines as follows: “the terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on
the basis of sex’ include, but are not limited to, because of or on the
basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions . . . .”137
While the Act does not define “related medical conditions,” the
PDA’s core purpose was to prohibit discrimination against women
based on “the whole range of matters concerning the childbearing
process”138 and to give women “the right . . . to be financially and
legally protected before, during, and after [their] pregnancies.”139
The PDA adopts the view, proposed by the dissent in Gilbert, that
Complaint, supra note 8.
Id.
135 Coleman v. Bobby Dodd Inst., Inc., No. 4:17-CV-29, 2017 WL 2486080, at *2 (M.D. Ga.
July 8, 2017).
136 Id.
137 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).
138 Hicks v. City of Tuscaloosa, 870 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2017) (internal quotations
omitted).
139 124 CONG. REC. 38574 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978) (statement of Rep. Sarasin).
133
134
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discrimination on the basis of a sex-linked condition like pregnancy
constitutes the very definition of sex discrimination, “for it is the
capacity to become pregnant which primarily differentiates the
female from the male.”140 Courts have interpreted the PDA as
covering a range of physiological conditions and their symptoms as
being medical conditions related to pregnancy and childbirth, such
as lactation, breastfeeding, and infertility treatments.141
Ambiguity arises when determining if menopause is a condition
“related to pregnancy and childbirth” under the PDA. Coleman’s
argument relied on the nature of the condition of menopause, which
represents the terminatation of a woman’s ability to become
pregnant.142 Menopause, which by definition affects only those with
female reproductive organs, is undoubtedly a sex-linked
condition.143 It typically occurs in women between the ages of 45-55
years and lasts four to eight years.144 The more common symptoms
of menopause include hot flashes, headaches, problems with
memory or concentration, and mood changes.
Although menopause is not a direct result of pregnancy, legal
commentators argue that the PDA encompasses all conditions
related to female reproductive capacity.145 These proponents of a
broader interpretation of the PDA assert that “there is no biological
function more specific to being female than the reproductive
system” and “[t]erminating an employee because of any . . . condition

140 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 162 (1976), superseded by statute, Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k), as recognized in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
463 U.S. 85 (1983). (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141 See, e.g., EEOC v. Houston Funding II, Ltd., 717 F.3d 425, 428 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding
that lactation is covered under Title VII because it is a medical condition that is related to
pregnancy).
142 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (describing the basis of Coleman’s suit).
143 Menopause,
Merriam-Webster Medical Dictionary 2017, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/menopause (defining “menopause” as “the natural cessation of
menstruation occurring usually between the ages of 45 and 55” and “the physiological period
in the life of a woman in which such cessation and the accompanying regression of ovarian
function occurs”).
144 Id.
145 See, e.g., Jay-Anne B. Casuga, supra note 9. Emily Martin, general counsel and vice
president of workplace justice for the National Women’s Law Center in Washington stated
that, “[W]hen an employer takes action against somebody because something is unique and
indicative of their sex, that is a form of discrimination that is unlawful.” Id.
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related to that system amounts to terminating an employee because
of her sex.”146
Some courts, such as the Eleventh Circuit, have viewed the
language of the PDA as inclusive in that the term “‘because of sex’
includes, but is not limited to, because of or on the basis of
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.”147 The term
“related” is a generous choice of wording and could suggest that
courts should favor inclusion rather than exclusion in close cases.148
Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit found that breastfeeding is
protected under the PDA because it clearly imposes upon women a
burden that male employees could not suffer.149
The Seventh Circuit supported a broader interpretation of the
Act when it held that medical issues associated with female
infertility were protected since they are conditions involving the
capacity to become pregnant.150 Extending this logic, one could
argue that menopause stems from the termination of the ability to
become pregnant, and therefore the PDA’s inclusive language
demonstrates Congressional intent for the Act to protect all medical
conditions related to a woman’s reproductive capacity.
While courts have recognized Title VII’s application to a number
of other sex-linked conditions related to female reproduction, case
law is practically non-existent in addressing if the PDA protects
menopause and the conditions that stem from it. Even the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, which enforces Title VII,
has yet to address whether a discharge based on menstruation is
sex discrimination.151 Cases which involve medical issues regarding
menstruation are the most analogous fact patterns to Coleman’s
case.

146 Kate Sedey, Court Holds Termination for Menstruation is Not Sex Discrimination.
Seriously??, THE CASE LAW FIRM (Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.thecaselawfirm.com/2017/08/
25/court-holds-termination-menstruation-not-sex-discrimination-seriously/.
147 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012) (emphasis added); see also Hicks v. City of Tuscaloosa, 870
F.3d 1253, 1259 (11th Cir. 2017) (interpreting “not limited to” to permit additional inclusions
if they are sufficiently similar).
148 See Hicks v. City of Tuscaloosa, 870 F.3d 1253, 1259 (11th Cir. 2017) (defining “not
limited to” as a catchall phrase).
149 Id. at 1260.
150 See Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644, 645 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that employment actions
taken on account of child bearing capacity affect only women).
151 See Matambanadzo supra note 34, at 226 (outlining the ambiguity of the PDA).
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The Fifth Circuit addressed an employer’s policy that required
women returning from maternity leave to demonstrate that their
menstrual cycles had returned to normal.152 The court found that
employment decisions related to women’s menstrual cycles were
covered under the PDA, and therefore, the policy constituted
prohibited sex discrimination.153 The court reasoned that the
employer’s policy “clearly deprive[d] [females] of employment
opportunities and impose[d] a . . . burden which male employees
need not suffer.”154 While this type of policy deals with a medical
condition occurring immediately after pregnancy, a similar
rationale could support protecting menopausal women from
experiencing burdens nonexistent for male employees.
Other legal commentators and some courts favor a narrower
interpretation of the PDA, “adher[ing] to a strict, biologicalessentialist view of pregnancy, which restricts pregnancy to the
forty-week period between conception and childbirth.”155 In Jirak v.
Federal Express Corp., the Southern District of New York held that
menstrual cramps are not a medical condition related to pregnancy,
and therefore, disparate treatment on such a basis is not sex
discrimination.156 The court found that although menstruation is a
uniquely female attribute neither federal statute nor pertinent case
authority support its protection under the PDA.157 Additionally, the
Eighth Circuit interpreted the Act strictly and found that medical
issues associated with infertility occur prior to pregnancy and that
“the language of the PDA does not suggest that ‘related medical
conditions’” should be this inclusive.158 A literal interpretation of the
PDA is appealing to some because of its potential for clarity and
consistency.159
While a narrow textual approach draws a bright line around
physical pregnancy, it undermines the PDA’s purpose and permits
employers to discriminate against women based on pregnancyHarper v. Thiokol Chemical Corp., 619 F.2d 489, 491 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 491–92.
154 Id.
155 Matambanadzo, supra note 34, at 218.
156 Jirak v. Fed. Express Corp., 805 F. Supp. 193, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
157 Id.
158 Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 679 (8th Cir. 1996).
159 See Matambanadzo, supra note 34, at 218 (discussing different approaches to
interpreting the PDA).
152
153
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related conditions and pregnancy-related social circumstances.160 It
may also be unduly restrictive given the breath of the PDA’s
statutory language.
The varied rationales of the courts and the lack of a standard
interpretation of the PDA show that additional clarification is
needed regarding what conditions are protected under the Act. To
correlate with the Act’s purpose and issues faced by the modernworking woman, Congress should extend the Act to protect women
from discrimination against all sex-linked conditions associated
with their reproductive system. Notably, a slippery slope arises with
regard to coverage of conditions unique to a male’s reproductive
system as well.
In contrast to an expansion of conditions covered by the PDA,
some legal commentators believe that it is not the condition that
matters, but it is whether an employer is disparately treating
similarly situated people based on gender.161 If sex-linked
conditions involving a woman’s reproductive system are not
protected under the PDA, a plaintiff can still bring a Title VII claim,
alleging she was discriminated against for being female.162 Most
courts, however, require plaintiff to claim that a similarly situated
male was treated more favorably.163 In these cases, it is extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to show a male comparator if the plaintiff
is alleging discrimination as a female based on a sex-linked
condition.
B. THE MALE COMPARATOR—IS A UNIQUE CONDITION ENOUGH?

The courts’ ongoing demand for comparator evidence is the most
formidable obstacle confronting plaintiffs who claim discrimination
based on sex-linked conditions. To bring an adequate discrimination
claim under the McDonnell Douglas framework, courts generally
require claimants to allege that the employer treated similarly
situated employees who are not members of their protected class

Id.
Id.
162 See Slater v. Energy Servs. Grp., 441 F. App’x 637, 640 (11th Cir. 2011) (utilizing the
McDonnell Douglas framework for discrimination claims under the PDA).
163 Id.
160
161

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2019

25

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 3 [2019], Art. 8

1210

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:1185

more favorably.164 In Title VII sex-discrimination cases, plaintiffs
must “adduce opposite-sex comparators—individuals similarly
situated to themselves in all relevant respects aside from biological
sex.”165
Many courts heavily rely on these comparisons to determine that
the alleged discrimination was truly based on sex.166 When insisting
upon comparator evidence, courts “often suggest that they are
simply deferring to congressional intent and remaining faithful to
the traditional conception of what it means to discriminate ‘because
of sex.’”167 This section will discuss the difficulty of producing
comparator evidence in sex-discrimination cases based on sexlinked conditions.
1. Menopause: Lacking a Comparison
The comparator requirement excludes from protection various
plaintiffs who otherwise could bring sufficient sex-discrimination
claims. In addition to people who work in sex-segregated places and
those who are uniquely situated in their jobs, plaintiffs who are
alleging discrimination based on medical conditions specific to their
sex, such as menopause, will often be unable to produce
comparators.168 Effectively, they will reside outside the scope of
Title VII’s protection.
In Coleman, the district court suggested that its ruling that
menopause was not covered by the PDA did not necessarily doom
Coleman’s claim.169 The Court observed that she could still have the
opportunity to present her claim using the traditional comparator
framework under McDonnell Douglas.170 Plaintiff argued that it

164 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973) (establishing the
prima facie four-pronged test for discrimination claims).
165 See Franklin, supra note 38, at 1367 (discussing the persistent demand for opposite-sex
comparators). But see Holland v. Gee, 677 F.3d 1047, 1056 (11th Cir. 2012) (stating that
where there is a “convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to
infer intentional discrimination” plaintiff need not allege a male comparator (quoting Smith
v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011))).
166 See Franklin, supra note 38, at 1367–68.
167 Id. at 1372.
168 Id. at 1368–69.
169 Coleman v. Bobby Dodd Inst. Inc., No. 4:17-CV-29, 2017 WL 2486080, at *2 (M.D. Ga.
July 8, 2017).
170 Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol53/iss3/8

26

Land: Battle of the Sexes: Title VII’s Failure to Protect Women from Di

2019]

BATTLE OF THE SEXES

1211

would have been impossible to identify a male comparator.171 The
Court suggested that Coleman could have alleged that male
employees “who soiled themselves and company property due to a
medical condition, such as incontinence, would have been treated
more favorably.”172
While it is not always essential to show a comparator, many
courts rely significantly on this factor when evaluating whether a
claim based on circumstantial evidence leads to a reasonable
inference of discrimination.173 But situations in which the
discrimination revolves around conditions related to female
reproductive capacity make it very difficult to allege a male
comparator.
Like the Coleman court, proponents of the comparator approach
suggest that a direct parallel is not necessary. Monica Khetarpal,
an attorney with Jackson Lewis in Chicago, describes a scenario in
which a man with priapism is fired because his prolonged erection
is causing distractions in the workplace.174 Khetarpal concludes
that the “proper analysis” is to evaluate if a woman with a similarly
distracting condition is also being disciplined or terminated.175
Coleman’s attorneys, as well as other legal commentators, are
not convinced that a male comparator should be necessary at all.176
These critics argue that such a formalistic approach has negatively
impacted the courts’ understanding of what it means to
discriminate because of sex, leaving deserving plaintiffs without
redress for discriminatory situations.177 And, in fact, various lower
courts have started to minimize their focus on the male comparator.
2. Elimination of The “Male Comparator”
The male comparator requirement in sex-discrimination claims
is particularly problematic because a similarly situated employee

Initial Brief, supra note 12, at 27.
Coleman, 2017 WL 2486080 at *2.
173 See Holland v. Gee, 677 F.3d 1047, 1056 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding that the McDonnell
Douglas framework is not required where the evidence leads to one reasonable inference –
discrimination).
174 See Casuga, supra note 9.
175 Id.
176 Initial Brief, supra note 12, at 27.
177 See Franklin, supra note 38, at 1373 (discussing how the male comparator requirement
shuts the door to some claims).
171
172
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often cannot be found. The very fact that a condition is sex-linked
makes it so specific to one sex that comparisons are usually illogical.
In these situations, the logical approach is to eliminate the malecomparator requirement. Various circuit courts and the EEOC have
found sufficient evidence for sex-discrimination claims in the
absence of alleging a male comparator. These decisions suggest that
“evidence of sex stereotyping alone may be sufficient to show that
gender played a part in an employer’s decision.”178
In a line of cases in which airlines implemented a policy
restricting female employees’ right to marry, the EEOC determined
that “[t]he concept of discrimination based on sex does not require
an actual disparity of treatment among male and female
employees.”179 The EEOC found it sufficient evidence that a
company policy or rule rested on stereotyped conceptions of women’s
sex and family roles, absent a male comparator.180 Rather than
focusing on a formalistic test, the EEOC focused on the purpose of
the PDA. The agency viewed the policy as discriminatory based on
the outcome it would render–“push[ing] women out of the workplace
and perpetuat[ing] the notion that after a woman married, her place
was in the home.”181
Similarly, in Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free School
District, the Second Circuit did not require the plaintiff to produce
a male comparator in order to show sex discrimination when an
employer denied a school psychologist her tenure because she had
kids at home.182 The Court found that “the notions that mothers are
insufficiently devoted to work, and that work and motherhood are
incompatible, are properly considered to be, themselves, genderbased.”183 And the First Circuit granted a plaintiff summary
judgement absent an allegation of a male comparator when a
woman was denied a promotion because she was busy with kids at
home.184 In both cases, the courts realized that denouncing the
Id. at 1369 (internal quotations omitted).
Neal v. Am. Airlines, Inc., EEOC Decision No. 6-6-5759, [1968-1969 Transfer Binder]
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P8002, at 6010 (June 20, 1968).
180 Id.
181 Franklin, supra note 38, at 1372.
182 Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 113–15 (2d Cir. 2004).
183 Id. at 121.
184 See Chadwick v. Wellpoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir. 2009) (granting summary
judgment for the plaintiff).
178
179
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negative actions of the employer outweighed the need to
mechanically apply the McDonnell Douglas test.
However, many courts continue to strictly adhere to the
McDonnell Douglas framework. The Supreme Court recently used
the comparator approach to assess a pregnancy-discrimination
claim in Young v. UPS.185 The Court required a plaintiff to show
that a non-pregnant individual was treated more favorably under
similar circumstances.186 Proponents of this approach argue that
adverse actions based on uniquely sex-based conditions alone do not
automatically constitute sex discrimination.187 While this may be
true, courts should lean away from the comparator requirement and
focus on other types of evidence for plaintiffs to be able to establish
their claim.
If sex-linked conditions related to a woman’s reproductive system
are not protected under the PDA, women seeking the protection of
Title VII will be required to compare themselves to similarly
situated males. While it would be beneficial to identify a male
comparator in every sex-discrimination claim, it is essentially
impossible in most situations regarding female-specific medical
conditions. As a solution, courts should realize the male-comparator
requirement is not essential to show sex discrimination and,
therefore, they should move beyond the McDonnell Douglas
framework and use alternative methods to evaluate the merits of
sex-discrimination claims.
V. CONCLUSION
The PDA is ambiguous regarding which medical conditions
relate to pregnancy. While its legislative history provides little
guidance as to its statutory interpretation, it is clear that the intent
of Congress was to protect women from sex discrimination in the

185 See Young v. UPS, 135 S.Ct. 1338, 1352 (holding that to bring a disparate treatment
claim under the PDA a pregnant employee must show that the employer refused to provide
accommodations and that the employer later provided accommodations to other employees
with similar restrictions); see also Jirak v. Fed. Express Corp., 805 F. Supp. 193, 195–96
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting that plaintiff did not produce evidence that the company’s
termination policy was applied differently to males than to females).
186 Young, 135 S.Ct. at 1352.
187 See, e.g., Casuga, supra note 9 (identifying the rationale relied upon by those who find
the requirement for a male comparator essential).
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workplace. The inclusive language of the PDA leans towards the
conclusion that all sex-linked conditions regarding a woman’s
reproductive capacity should be afforded the protection of the Act.
However, the PDA’s vague language leads to varying
interpretations amongst courts. Recently, court decisions involving
the PDA have protected breastfeeding and infertility as pregnancyrelated conditions but have not extended to cover more distant
conditions such as menopause.
In an ideal world, Congress would amend the PDA to prohibit
discrimination against all conditions related to a woman’s
reproductive capacity to increase clarity and consistency in
interpreting PDA claims. This amendment should include
menopause and all of the conditions that stem from it. Otherwise,
women may continue to be denied the right to bring successful
discrimination claims regarding conditions that are linked to their
reproductive system. And this in turn will allow the continuation of
sex discrimination in the workplace in defiance of the overarching
purpose of the PDA.
Similarly, the male-comparator requirement established in
McDonnell Douglas should not be a uniform requirement to
establish sex-discrimination claims. The McDonnell Douglas
framework was established by analyzing a racial-discrimination
case prior to the PDA and its continued use in other discrimination
situations should be reevaluated. When courts today dismiss sexdiscrimination claims because of the lack of a male comparator, they
are “shifting the focus away from the social meaning and practical
implications of discriminatory practices and toward questions about
their formal characteristics.”188
To remove sex discrimination from the workplace and provide a
meaningful remedy to its victims, Congress should expand the
protections of the PDA, and courts should abandon the formulistic
approach of requiring a male comparator. Despite its current
ambiguity, the PDA has the potential to broadly protect a variety of
sex-linked conditions and to do justice for the modern working
woman.

188

Franklin, supra note 38, at 1372.
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